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FOREWORD

This is one in the Special Series of monographs stemming
from the February 2001 conference on Plan Colombia
cosponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army
War College and The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center of the
University of Miami. In this monograph, Dr. Max G. Manwaring
provides a comprehensive analysis of the Colombian crisis
situation and makes viable recommendations to deal with it more
effectively.
In substantive U.S. national security terms, Dr. Manwaring
addresses the questions, “Why Colombia, Why Now, and What Is
To Be Done?” He explains the importance of that troubled country
to the United States. He points out that the fragile democracy of
Colombia is at risk, and that the violent spillover effects of three
simultaneous wars pose a threat to the rest of the Western
Hemisphere and the interdependent global community. Then Dr.
Manwaring makes a case against continued tactical and
operational approaches to the Colombian crisis and outlines what
must be done. In that connection, he recommends an actionable
political-military strategy to attain security, stability,
democratic governance, and a sustainable peace. The proposed
strategy would not be costly in monetary or military terms. It
would, however, require deliberate planning, cooperation, time,
and will.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to join with the
North-South Center in offering this monograph as part of our
attempt to clarify the issues regarding Plan Colombia, focus the
debate, and learn from it. That international security debate is
critically important to the vital interests of the United States,
Colombia, the hemisphere, and the global community.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
iii

PREFACE

This monograph by Dr. Max G. Manwaring is another in
a series to emerge from a joint project on Plan Colombia
begun last February by the U.S. Army War College and The
Dante B. Fascell North-South Center. In it, the author
places the dilemma of Colombia’s three-front “war” within
the framework of the national security strategy of the
United States. Dr. Manwaring answers the questions of
“why” and “how” in clear contextual terms.
The fact that “the fragile democracy of Colombia is at
risk” poses a threat to the entire Western Hemisphere. It is
not, the author points out, a single-country problem in a
country that has experienced instability and insurgency for
over 50 years. The situation has deteriorated to the point
where Colombia could become a failed state, with massive
spillover effects of insurgency, criminality, and
narco-trafficking in all of its neighboring countries.
In the post-Cold War scenario, security in Latin America
means for the United States more than keeping
Communism out of the Hemisphere, which it once did. It
now means underpinning democracy and free-market
economics, plus close cooperation on the immense “shared
problems” of drugs, crime, immigration, and environmental
concerns in the hemisphere. Colombia, in this sense, is a
challenge that is highly complex. It is, as the author points
out, “multidimensional, multilateral and multiorganizational.” In these terms, Plan Colombia and that
country’s positive turnaround and contribution to
hemispheric stability, prosperity, and peace will depend on
civil-military solutions implemented at the strategic level.
Ultimately, that will depend on U.S. leadership.
Dr. Manwaring presents an eloquent case for this
country to exercise that strategic leadership. To do so, he
underscores, Washington must advance beyond its
v

traditional swings from “benign neglect” of the Hemisphere
to various forms of operational-level political, economic, and
military intervention (often misguided). I would add that
Washington must also outgrow its short attention span.
That will require a great deal of analysis and education,
contributing to which is the underlying purpose of this
project. Our institutions are pleased to make this
contribution.

AMBLER H. MOSS, JR.
Director
The Dante B. Fascell North-South
Center
University of Miami
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U.S. SECURITY POLICY IN THE WESTERN
HEMISPHERE:
Why Colombia, Why Now,
and What Is To Be Done?

In the year 2000, the U.S. Congress provided a $1.3
billion package of assistance to enable Colombia to grapple
more effectively with its ongoing security problems.1 The
intent of this legislation, which came to be known as Plan
Colombia, was to help address the counterdrug “war” in
Colombia. The intent was also to encourage serious
complementary Colombian and international actions to
address the political, economic, and social instability
generated out of Colombia’s other two “wars”—the “war”
against so-called paramilitary self-defense forces and the
“war” against a 50-year-old insurgency.2 Even before
President William J. Clinton asked the Congress for a major
2-year assistance program for Colombia, that country was
the third largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid money, after
Egypt and Israel. 3 A s a c o n s e q u e n c e , m a n y
Americans—and others—at all levels, have begun to ask,
“Why Colombia, why now, and what is to be done?”
Before answering these questions, strategic leaders and
thinkers, policymakers, and opinionmakers must be clear
on what a situation such as that in Colombia is and what it
is not. This, according to Carl von Clausewitz, is “the first of
all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.”4 Given
that determination, senior leaders and their staffs can
correctly identify and prioritize centers of gravity and link
policy, strategy, force structure and equipment, and
campaign plans to achieve strategic clarity and solve the
central strategic problem. This monograph, then, seeks to
explain the Colombian situation with an eye toward
strategic clarity and what Sun Tzu would call “the
perfection of strategy.”5

1

An evaluation of U.S. policy toward Latin America and
Colombia and its implications for the military begins with
an understanding of the purposes and patterns of interest
over the years. As a corollary, it is important to remember
that an evaluation of contemporary security policy in the
Western Hemisphere also hinges on an understanding of
the broadening view of U.S. national security. In developing
these themes, the author (1) analyzes the major tenets of
U.S. policy toward Latin America; (2) examines the
broadening concept of security; and (3) explains and
clarifies “Why Colombia, why now, and what is to be done?”
With that background, he elaborates “What is to be done.”
In these terms, the author (4) outlines some strategic and
high operational-level imperatives for U.S. civil-military
involvement in Colombia; (5) puts forward some additional
recommendations for playing in that security arena; and (6)
addresses the strategic adaptation of U.S. military power to
the Colombian threat situation. Such an exercise will,
hopefully, stimulate North American, Colombian, and
Latin American thinking and action regarding a set of
complicated security problems that—whether or not one
likes it or is prepared to deal with it—are likely to be with us
for some time beyond the year 2001.
The Major Tenets of U.S. Policy Toward Latin
America and the Criteria for Intervention.
The keynote of U.S. policy toward Latin America was
implicit in President George Washington’s farewell address
of 1796.6 Opposition to extra-continental control over the
territories of the Western Hemisphere was made explicit in
four subsequent policy statements: The No-Transfer
Resolution of 1811, the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, the
Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine of 1904, and the
Wilson Corollary of 1913.7 Thus, virtually every policy
statement and action regarding Latin America from the
successful U.S. negotiations to purchase Florida from Spain
in 1821, to the intervention in Haiti in 1994, to the present,
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traces its conceptual origins back to these fundamental
tenets.
The Major Tenets. The No-Transfer Resolution of 1811
reflected concern that Spain might transfer Florida to Great
Britain. Foreshadowing the Monroe Doctrine, this
resolution made it clear that the United States “cannot,
without serious inquietude, see any part of said territory
pass into the hands of any foreign power.”8 The Monroe
Doctrine broadened the 1811 prohibition of a Floridato-Great Britain territorial transfer so as to embrace all
western hemisphere territory and all other extracontinental powers. Its key phrase asserted, “. . . we should
consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to
any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace
and safety.”9 As one relatively recent example of the
application of that doctrine in Latin America, President
Lyndon Johnson implicitly invoked this doctrine in 1965 in
connection with preventing the establishment of a
communist government in the Dominican Republic:
I think it is a well-known and advertised doctrine of the
Hemisphere that the principles of communism are
incompatible with the principles of our inter-American
system. President Kennedy enunciated that on several
occasions. The Organization of American States enunciated
that. I merely repeated it.10

Yet, justifications of U.S. interventions, especially since
the end of the Cold War, are more reminiscent of the
Roosevelt and Wilson Corollaries than the Monroe Doctrine
itself. In 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt was concerned
about instability in the Western Hemisphere. He declared
that “chronic wrongdoing, or impotence which results in a
general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may finally
require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the
Western Hemisphere the United States cannot ignore this
duty.”11 Under these terms, the United States interfered
imperiously and repeatedly in such places as Cuba, the

3

Dominican Republic, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama in
the 19th and early 20th centuries.12
Actions of the Wilson administration, its predecessors,
and successors generated additional interventions in the
Caribbean Basin in the early 1900s. It is argued that the
application of the Wilson Corollary in Latin American
affairs brought “the gospel of democracy and morality to all
concerned whether they wanted it or not.”13 The application
of this policy, in conjunction with the Roosevelt Corollary,
included the occupation of the port of Vera Cruz, Mexico, in
1914; the occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934; and the
occupation of the Dominican Republic from 1912 to 1933.
The intent, even then, was to establish the bases of
democracy and restore financial and political stability.14
At the same time, U.S. policy toward Latin America
demonstrated that the Panama Canal and the sea lanes
connecting the east and west coasts of the continental
United States must remain in U.S. or friendly hands. This
strategic concept was the underpinning of President Dwight
Eisenhower’s support for the 1954 overthrow of the “leftist”
Arbenz government in Guatemala. As already noted, it was
also the basis for President Johnson’s political justification
of the 1965 invasion of The Dominican Republic. 15
Nevertheless, the argument for protecting the United
States and the hemisphere from an extra-continental power
has receded into the background more and more since 1965.
Because of the end of the Cold War and the concomitant
major power confrontations in the Western Hemisphere,
recent U.S. interventions in the Caribbean Basin have been
discussed more in the Wilsonian and Rooseveltian terms of
“democracy,” “morality,” “instability,” and “human rights”
than in the Monrovian expressions of concern regarding
territorial threats from a “foreign” power. The U.S.
interventions in Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, and
Haiti in 1994 are cases in point.16 The concept of responding
to traditional threats from extra-continental powers has
given way to countering nonterritorial threats from
4

“hostile” or “disruptive” hemispheric governments and
political actors.
Additionally, the broad behavioral pattern of recent
indirect U.S. involvement in Latin America includes giving
democracy a chance in countries such as Grenada, Panama,
and Haiti; training military and/or police forces and
working for economic development in the hope of creating
political stability throughout the entire hemisphere; and
restoring financial order in Brazil and Mexico. 1 7
Nevertheless, and despite the justifying rhetoric, the basic
causal linkage between instability anywhere in the
hemisphere and a threat to U.S. security has been—and
continues to be—the cognitive bedrock of U.S. policy toward
Latin America in general and toward Colombia now and in
the future.18
Conclusions. In the past, security has been achieved
primarily as a result of maintaining what Lars Schoultz
calls strategic access and denial.19 That is, strategic access
to the Western Hemisphere for the United States and
strategic denial of the region to extra-continental
adversaries or potential adversaries. More recently, the
United States has expanded that concept to include
hostile—and disruptive—hemispheric governments and
other political actors. The United States has thus not
suffered gladly governments or actors that threaten or
undermine the development of a stable, democratic, and
prosperous hemispheric community. U.S. support for the
1974 overthrow of the “destabilizing” government of
Salvador Allende in Chile is one example. U.S. support for
the 1981 coup against the “narco” government of General
Luis Garcia Meza in Bolivia is another. The leftist
government of Fidel Castro in Cuba is obviously something
of an exception—but gladly is the operative word in this
case.20
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Broadening the Concept of Security.
When what mattered most in U.S. policy toward Latin
America was maintaining military bases and preserving
access to sea lanes of communication, choke points, raw
materials, and hydrocarbons and denying these assets to an
enemy or its surrogates, the United States could generally
ignore internal conditions in specific countries. This was the
U.S. stance toward Latin American until the early 1960s.
Policymakers, decisionmakers, and opinionmakers could be
content with “good partner” regimes in key countries—even
if those regimes were undemocratic and corrupt.21 A violent
example of the Latin American reaction to this policy was
seen in anti-American demonstrations and mobbing and
spitting on Vice-President Richard Nixon during his visit to
Latin America in April 1958. Remarkably, an ex-president
of Costa Rica, normally supportive of the United States,
justified the Latin American behavior toward Nixon at that
time by arguing that the United States had first spat on
Latin America by bolstering, decorating, and even
sheltering torture-chamber dictators. He further argued
that Latin America could not spit on the United States—all
that could be done was to take out its frustrations on the
vice-president.22
Additional Factors for the Contemporary Security
Equation. Now, in 2001, the United States is also seriously
concerned about the western hemisphere’s development of
democratic and free market institutions and human rights;
cooperation on shared problems such as illegal drugs, the
environment, and refugees; and the ability of others to buy
North American and Latin American products. As a result,
the United States must concern itself with nontraditional
internal national and regional well-being. 23 In this
connection, the national security strategy of the United
States now and over the past several years states that the
principal U.S. security concerns in Latin America are
internal and transnational in nature and have serious
implications for national and regional well-being. They
6

include illegal drug trafficking, organized crime, money
laundering, illegal immigration, firearms and human
trafficking, and terrorism. Additionally, North Americans
are beginning to recognize the dangers to national and
regional stability produced by corruption, ineffective legal
systems, and illegitimate governance.24
All of these threats—especially drug trafficking—
produce adverse social effects that undermine the
sovereignty, democracy, stability, well-being, and security
of all the countries of the Western Hemisphere, including
the United States.25 The notion that a criminal activity such
as illegal drug trafficking could constitute a threat to
national security may seem odd at first. It is generally
perceived that narcotics dealers do not present an overt
physical threat to the people or territory of a nation-state.
Accordingly, the illegal drug industry has not been
considered an inherent national security threat. Yet, the
potential for the illegal drug trafficking industry to destroy
social mores and produce dysfunctional behavior in a
society has a direct bearing on the political process. As it
undermines vital institutional pillars of regime stability,
the internal and transnational narcotics industry presents
a challenge to the control of any country thus affected. This,
in turn, generates security problems for producer countries,
consumer countries, transit countries, and the global
community.26
Illustrations from the Hemisphere. Two examples
evolving out of the Colombian situation should suffice to
make the point. First, with billions of dollars in revenues,
Colombian narco-traffickers have bribed, intimidated,
kidnapped, and assassinated government leaders, judges,
law enforcement and military officials, journalists, citizens,
and even soccer players. They have infiltrated and suborned
the institutional pillars of regime stability such as the civil
bureaucracy, the courts, the police, and the army. They have
also provided ingratiating patronage to the poor and
directly manipulated and distorted the democratic political
process. As a consequence, they have made a concerted
7

effort to slow down and/or paralyze the government and
establish themselves as an untouchable entity above the
state.27 Indeed, it has been argued that the illegal narcotics
industry in Colombia and elsewhere is a “state within the
state.”28 In this sense, illegal drug trafficking is not simply a
criminal activity. It is more than that. It has created major
political-psychological-economic-social-moral conflicts and
presents a clear and present threat to the existence of the
state as we know it.29
Second, the spillover effects of the illegal drug industry
have inspired violence, corruption, and instability
throughout Latin America in general and Caribbean transit
countries in particular. The 1992 report by the West Indian
Commission captures the essence of the scope and gravity of
this “equal opportunity” phenomenon:
Nothing poses greater threats to civil society in [Caribbean]
countries than the drug problem, and nothing exemplifies the
powerlessness of regional governments more. That is the
magnitude of the damage that drug abuse and trafficking hold
for our Community. It is a many-layered danger. At base is the
human destruction implicit in drug addiction; but implicit also
is the corruption of individuals and systems by the sheer
enormity of the inducements of the illegal drug trade in
relatively poor societies. On top of all this lie the implications for
governance itself—at the hands of both external agencies
engaged in inter-national interdiction, and the drug barons
themselves—the “dons” of the modern Caribbean—who
threaten governance from within.30

Thus, Colombia is of particular importance because the
illegal drug trade represents a dual threat to the authority
of that government—and to those of its neighbors. It
challenges the central governance of countries affected, and
it undermines the vital institutional pillars of regime
legitimacy and stability.31
Conclusions. Colombia’s and, by extension, Latin
America’s contemporary importance to the United States
has major implications for policy in 2001 and beyond. It
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suggests that the United States must concern itself with the
region’s social, economic, and political conditions. Yet, it is
not enough to consider the need for political reform and
socio-economic development. Because the illegal drug
industry, insurgent groups, and paramilitary “self-defense”
organizations are all firmly established, a targeted
government such as that of Colombia has no choice but to
institute more direct military-police actions to destroy or
neutralize these threats to its security. Thus, the security
task appears more and more to consist of two highly
interrelated elements. It involves dealing with both the root
causes and the violent consequences of instability. At the
most fundamental level, however, the real threat would
come from failing to recognize and respond—at the highest
levels—to the dangers that instability poses to Colombia
and the rest of the interdependent global community.32
As a consequence, internal and transnational
conflict—to include the so-called drug war—can no longer
be considered essentially a short-term, low-level law
enforcement effort. Rather, it is a long-term intranational,
national, and transnational conflict involving Clausewitz’s
multiple “forgotten” political-economic-social-psychological
dimensions of strategy.33 The challenge in redefining the
term “security,” then, is to understand that it operates on
three different levels. First, security must be considered to
be protection and preservation of a people’s freedom from
external military attack and coercion perpetrated by
traditional state actors—and from subversion and the
erosion of cherished political, economic, and social values
perpetrated by internal and transnational non-state
political actors. Second, according to these terms, security is
multidimensional and transnational and must be
understood and dealt with as such. Third and finally,
security is a problem that may involve multiple internal,
external, and transnational enemies. As such, security is
complex and ambiguous, requiring rethinking objectives,
ways, and means of achieving it.34
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“Why Colombia? Why Now, and What Is To Be
Done?”
Since the early 19th century, the primary interests of the
United States in Latin America have been to encourage,
maintain, and enhance a stable, peaceful, and secure
southern flank. At the same time, U.S. national security
policy remains firmly committed to the interdependent
regional objectives of democracy and free-market economic
progress.35 The rationale for the expansion of the concept of
security from maintaining military defenses against
external military threats to include internal political,
economic, and social concerns is the realization that U.S.
security is inextricably tied to the stability, prosperity, and
well-being of the interdependent hemispheric and global
communities.36 Unfortunately, the tendency has been to
take a business-as-usual, ad hoc, and piecemeal “crisis
management” approach rather than a proactive approach to
the achievement of these objectives.
“Why Colombia?” Within the hemispheric context,
Colombia is important to the United States because of its
potential for further development of democratic and
free-market institutions and improvement of human rights
standards; its potential for increasing (legal) bilateral
trade; and its potential for cooperation on shared problems
such as illegal drugs, illegal immigration, and
environmental issues. More specifically, Colombia is an
important U.S. trading partner and a key factor in the Latin
American and global economic equations.37
To illustrate Colombia’s importance economically:
Colombia’s legal two-way trade with the United States
amounts to $10 billion per year; it is South America’s
fourth-largest economy; and it provides the fifth-largest
U.S. export market in Latin America. Moreover, the
Western Hemisphere accounts for nearly 40 percent of the
United States’ two-way world trade, compared to 33 percent
for the Pacific Rim and 21 percent for Europe.38 Another
crucial fact is that two of the four largest suppliers of energy
10

to the United States are Venezuela and Colombia. Within
the interdependent global economy and security
environments, the argument is uncomplicated. That is, as
these interests are maintained and enhanced in Colombia,
they enhance the stability, prosperity, and well-being of the
Western Hemisphere and the interdependent global
community. However, to the extent that these interests are
not maintained and enhanced in Colombia, they degrade
the potential of the region and the world.39 Clearly,
significant interests are at stake.
“After Nearly 50 Years of Internal Instability and
Drug-Related Turmoil in Colombia, Why Is the United
States Now Becoming More Seriously Interested in Helping
That Country?” The problem, at the moment, is that
Colombia (including its potential), is deteriorating because
three simultaneous and interrelated wars—insurgency,
illegal drug trafficking, and growing vigilante paramilitary
movements—are directly threatening the democracy,
economic progress, and social fabric of that country.
Internal deterioration may be illustrated by three facts.
First, violence associated directly with internal turmoil is
claiming over 3,500 lives every year. Second, violence is
generating over 1.5 million displaced persons and 800,000
emigrants who are finding new homes in other countries in
Latin America, the United States, Europe, and Canada.
Third, Colombia’s internal turmoil is also inducing a
contracting economy that declined by more than 5 percent
in 1999 and has produced 20 percent unemployment and the
worst recession since the 1930s.40
Colombia’s three simultaneous wars (think of the
“Hobbesian Trinity”) also indirectly threaten the stability
and well-being of its neighbors. In this connection,
narco-traffickers have for some time operated back and
forth across Colombia’s borders and have taken with them
violence, corruption, and criminality wherever they have
gone. Colombian insurgents and paramilitary groups have
also made frequent incursions into the neighboring
countries of Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.
11

The resulting violence and instability are undermining the
sovereignty, security, and well-being of these countries.41
Another negative result of turmoil in Colombia and the
region—the abundant flow of narcotics into the United
States to satisfy its great demand—is sufficiently obvious
and well documented not to require much elaboration.
Suffice it to note that illegal drug use in the United States
kills some 52,000 people every year, and costs are estimated
at $100 billion to $500 billion per year in the United States
for illegal drug-related health care and accidents.42
Most significant, there is now explicit recognition that
Colombia’s current situation has reached crisis proportions,
though an alarmist prognosis would probably be
counterproductive. Yet, it would be irresponsible not to note
that the illegal drug trafficking and paramilitary and
insurgent organizations are perpetrating a level of
corruption, criminality, humanitarian horror, and internal
instability that—if left unchecked—can ultimately
threaten the collapse of the Colombian state and undermine
the political sovereignty of its neighbors.43
The Corollary Question: “What Is To Be Done?” The
urgent problem for decisionmakers and policymakers is to
analyze the seriousness of the crisis in Colombia and decide
exactly what to do beyond what is already being done under
Plan Colombia. Significant current activities appear to be
ad hoc, piecemeal, and disjointed. These activities are
centered on the $1.3 billion of U.S. military support to only
one component of the central strategic problem—the drug
war. At the same time, the European and Japanese
contributions to the strategic social and economic
components of Plan Colombia have been meager. The
Colombian contribution to make up the balance of the entire
$7.5 billion package has not been spelled out. In that
connection, operational-level activities addressing
problems such as crop substitution, judicial reform, and
human rights abuses appear to be based on “crisis control”
rather than a coherent, coordinated plan of action. This
dysfunctional approach is failing to reconcile the
12

aspirations listed in Plan Colombia with the reality of the
strategic situation in the country and the region. As a
consequence, the illegal drug trafficking industry continues
to be strong, ruthless, adaptable, and wealthy—and
continues to exploit the weaknesses of the government. In
turn, there is considerable confusion, frustration, and
ambiguity concerning the intent, objectives, and viability of
the plan.44
A lack of cooperative, holistic, and strategic-level
involvement within Colombia is generating great risks for
that country and the world around it. In light of the
dynamics of Colombia’s Hobbesian Trinity, there is ample
reason for worldwide concern. At this time, the Colombian
focus on the operational, micro-level, drug war security
question in the short term, leaving strategic macro-level
security, political, economic, and social issues to be dealt
with in the future—by others—leaves much to be desired.
The Colombian drug issue is only one piece of a larger and
more complex strategic puzzle. Solving that puzzle will
require a long-term and holistic strategic solution. It is time
for the United States, Colombia, and the global community
to go beyond the present uncertainties of Plan Colombia and
deal more vigorously and cooperatively with an urgent
strategic agenda that greatly affects the interdependent
global economic, political, and security arena.45
Conclusions. The strategic ambiguity and general
confusion reflected in the questions about “Why Colombia,
why now, and what is to be done?” are the results of two
common denominators: (1) a radically different security
environment than that addressed, and (2) the lack of a
strategic,cooperative, holistic, and long-term foreign policy
and military strategy to deal with that environment. The
crisis situation in Colombia is not simply and singly the
result of illegal drug production and trafficking. That is only
one of the consequences of long-standing political, economic,
and social inequities that have spawned that country’s
Hobbesian Trinity of three simultaneous wars. Thus, what
must be attempted in Colombia will require considerable
13

effort in several different dimensions—political-diplomatic,
socio-economic, psychological-moral, and stabilitysecurity—simultaneously. Unless these macro-level issues
are addressed cooperatively, holistically, and strategically,
Colombia’s three wars will continue indefinitely. And, as
Sun Tzu reminds us, the attendant national, regional, and
global deterioration will work to the benefit of no one.46
Implications, Part 1: Strategic and High
Operational-Level Imperatives for Civil-Military
Involvement in Colombia.
What is required, then, is a combined civil-military effort
to apply the full human and physical resources of
cooperating nations to generate the real well-being of
Colombia and its political, economic, and geographic
neighbors. In these terms, the attempt to resolve the conflict
in Colombia cannot be a strictly operational-level,
military-police effort. Clausewitz’s translator, Michael
Howard, reminds us that an adequate response must be
essentially a strategic political-economic-moral-security
effort. The most refined tactical doctrine and operational art
carried out by the optimum military or police structure in
pursuit of a policy that ignores the strategic whole—to
include the populace—will be irrelevant.47 It must also be
remembered that if one wants strategic clarity to optimize
effectiveness, one must precede tactical and operational
efforts with relevant policy direction—and a strategy, an
organizational structure, and appropriate tools of power.48
Some Fundamental Requirements for a Grand Strategy.
Success in countering the chaos of the Colombian crisis and
fulfilling the hope for national, regional, and global
well-being will be constructed on the same pillars that
supported favorable results in the past. These pillars of
success are conceptual, organizational, and operational.
They form the foundation for a strategic paradigm for
engagement, unity of effort, and holistic multidimensional
and multinational organizations and programs designed to
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promote and consolidate political, economic, social, and
security legitimization efforts.
In the past, the United States worked hard to develop
strategic paradigms (i.e., theories of engagement). As an
example, a great deal of intellectual energy, national
debate, and writing, to say nothing of war gaming, went into
the question of how and under what circumstances the
United States could politically, economically,
psychologically, and militarily deter and contain the Soviet
Union. Now, the United States must seek to understand a
new central strategic problem and, in the counterdrug case,
be able to deal with more than the strictly law enforcement
aspects of hemispheric security. Theories of engagement are
as important for success in “unconventional conflict” as they
are in conventional war. This is the first conceptual
requirement.49
Second, the United States developed an executive
branch management organizational structure to implement
the strategic paradigm that brought both military and
civilian assets to the field of confrontation with the former
enemy. In this connection, government must restructure
itself to the extent necessary to establish the appropriate
political organization to achieve an effective unity of effort
and ensure that the application of the various civilian and
military instruments of power directly contribute to the
achievement of the political end-state dictated by the
strategic paradigm. Generating a more complete unity of
effort requires contributions at the international level as
well.
Critical organizational points are: (1) Colombia and its
internal and external allies must be in general agreement
as to what the central strategic problem is; (2) these parties
must be in general agreement on national goals and an
associated set of programs designed to contribute directly to
the achievement of the mutually agreed-upon end-state; (3)
these requirements reflect the need for an international
organizational structure for improved coordination and
15

cooperation between Colombia and its internal and external
allies; and (4) all of this requires mutual cultural awareness
and sensitivity. Otherwise, the various national and
international civil-military actions will work at
cross-purposes, be counter-productive, and/or be
irrelevant.50 These points are primarily organizational
requirements.
Third, the United States worked very hard to generate
the conceptual, technological, and industrial capability to
produce major direct and indirect political-diplomatic,
socio-economic, psychological-moral, and military-police
instruments of power that were both offensive and
defensive. The intent was to support the deterrence and
containment strategies that came out of George F. Kennan’s
strategic paradigm for the containment of the Soviet
Union.51 Today, the United States must develop and
incorporate the appropriate instruments of power by which
the root causes and consequences of Colombia’s instability
might be neutralized. Present-day actions are meant to
influence significantly the society and political system of a
country such as Colombia to help the government regain
control of its own territory, society, and political
system—not an attempt by the United States to gain some
sort of political, economic, or territorial concession.52 These
are primarily operational requirements.
Conclusions. Strategic paradigms, organizational
structure, and appropriate instruments of power to
implement the follow-on strategies and effect the necessary
cooperation and coordination of effort should not be
considered relics of a bygone era. Indeed, those civilian and
military leaders assigned to the difficult but urgent task of
developing and implementing U.S. national security policy
and strategies now and in the future would do well to
rethink and apply these fundamental strategic components
of success to the requirements of the contemporary
international security environment—and that of
Colombia.53
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Implications, Part 2: Seven Additional Strategic
and High Operational-Level Civil-Military
Imperatives for Playing in the Contemporary
Global Security Arena.
In September 2000, President Clinton opened the
summit meeting of world leaders at the United Nations. On
that occasion, he urged the gathering to prepare national
and international institutions for a new age in which
unilateral and multilateral forces will have to “reach
regularly and rapidly inside national boundaries to protect
threatened people.”54 The president was responding to the
realities of the so-called “new world disorder.” Those
realities center on the idea that although contemporary
conflict is political-psychological-moral, it is also violent.
Thus, the military has an important role to play in any
given conflict situation, especially that of Colombia. That
role, however, must be based on the correct identification of
a range of actions and in proper proportions—that are
subordinated to and in support of the larger political,
economic, social, and security components of such a conflict.
Thus, political and military leaders, planners, and
implementers would do well to recognize that in fighting a
foe today and in the future, the situation has changed.
Fighting the Hobbesian Trinity in Colombia today is no
exception to the rule of change.55 We can see that in the
following seven ways.
Ambiguity. First, the definitions of “enemy” and “victor”
are elusive, and there is a lack of consensus on the use of
“power” to secure, maintain, and enhance vital interests.
Underlying these ambiguities is the fact that contemporary
conflict is more often than not an intra-state affair that
international law and convention are only beginning to
address. A part of one society is pitted against another. In
these so-called “teacup” wars,56 the following clear-cut
conditions do not apply or are not present; therefore there
are (1) normally no formal declaration or termination of
conflict, (2) no easily identified human foe to attack and
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destroy, (3) no specific territory to take and hold, (4) no
single credible government or political actor with which to
deal, (5) no legal niceties such as mutually recognized
national borders and Geneva Conventions to help control
the situation, (6) no guarantee that any agreement between
or among contending authorities will be honored, and (7) no
specific rules to guide leadership in a given “engagement”
process. These aspects of the global security environment in
general and in the Colombian context in particular are not
only complex, they are ambiguous.
The Need to Redefine “Enemy,” “Power,” and “Victory.”
Second, as a consequence, there is a need to redefine
“enemy,” “power,” and “victory.” The enemy is no longer a
recognizable military entity or an industrial capability to
make traditional war. The enemy now becomes “violence”
and the causes of violence. Thus, the purposes of power have
changed. Power is not simply “hard” combat fire power
directed at a traditional enemy military formation or
industrial complex. Power is multi-layered, combining
“hard” and “soft” political, psychological, moral,
informational, economic, societal, military, police, and civil
bureaucratic activities that can be brought to bear
appropriately on the causes as well as the perpetrators of
violence. And victory is no longer the acknowledged
destruction of an enemy’s military capability. Victory (or
success) is now—more frequently, and perhaps with a bit of
“spin control”—defined as the achievement of stability and
a “sustainable peace.”57 Plan Colombia is a case in point.
A New Center of Gravity. Third, these ambiguities
intrude on the comfortable vision of war in which the
assumed center of gravity has been enemy military
formations and the physical capability to conduct war.
Clausewitz reminds us, however, that “in countries subject
to domestic strife . . . and popular uprisings, the [center of
gravity] is the personalities of the leaders and public
opinion. It is against these that our energies should be
directed.”58 Thus, in contemporary intranational conflict,
the primary center of gravity changes from a familiar
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military concept to an ambiguous and uncomfortable
multidimensional political-economic-psychologicalsecurity paradigm. Again, the Colombian situation is no
exception to the Clausewitzian dictum.
Asymmetry. Fourth, strategic asymmetry is the use of
disparity between contending parties to gain an advantage.
Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson have defined strategic
asymmetry as:
acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in
order to maximize one’s own advantages, exploit an
opponent’s weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain greater
freedom of action. It can be political-strategic,
military-strategic, operational, or a combination of these. It
can entail different methods, technologies, values,
organizations, time perspectives, or some combination of
these. It can be short-term or long-term. It can be deliberate or
by default. It can be discrete or pursued in conjunction with
symmetric approaches. It can have both psychological and
physical dimensions.59

Asymmetry is a concept as old as war itself, but some
military officers and political leaders don’t like it. They
argue that asymmetry is not fighting fair. That is
unfortunate. What many first world military and political
leaders seem not to have learned is that contemporary drug
traffickers, insurgents, and paramilitaries—such as those
operating in Colombia—can be what Ralph Peters calls
“wise competitors.” He argues,
Wise competitors will not even attempt to defeat us on our
terms; rather, they will seek to shift the playing field away
from conventional military confrontations or turn to terrorism
and nontraditional forms of assault on our national integrity.
Only the foolish will fight fair.60

Conflict Has Become Multidimensional, Multilateral,
and Multiorganizational. Fifth, the conflictive means to
secure, maintain, and enhance interests abroad have
become multidimensional, multilateral, and
multiorganizational. The conflict in Colombia is not a
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military-to-military confrontation. That conflict now
involves the entire population as well as a large number of
national civilian, military, and police agencies, other
national civilian organizations, international
organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
and subnational indigenous actors who must work together
to deal effectively with complex internal and transnational
threats to security, peace, and well-being.
As a result, a viable unity of effort is required to
coordinate the multilateral, multidimensional, and
multiorganizational effort necessary for successful
engagement in the contemporary interdependent world.
Because of the difficulty in achieving it, that ideal has rarely
been achieved in the past. Nevertheless, in this changed and
infinitely more complex security arena, governments and
their functional agencies, the various NGOs, and the
diverse international organizations involved in the pursuit
of stability, peace, and well-being must make the necessary
effort to develop ways and means of working toward a more
effective unity.61
Deterrence. Sixth, threats associated with the growing
sophistication of biological, chemical, and cyber war are
intensifying. At the same time, other “nontraditional”
threats and menaces emanating from virtually a thousand
different political actors with a cause—and the will to
conduct asymmetrical warfare—are spreading havoc
throughout the global community. The deterrence task is
straightforward. Culturally effective ways and means must
be found to convince Colombia’s “nontraditional”
narco-traffickers, insurgents, and paramilitary players that
it is not in their best interests—whatever those may be—to
continue their negative behavior. Deterrence is not
necessarily military—although that is important. It is not
necessarily negative or directly coercive—although that,
too, is important. Deterrence is broader than that.
Deterrence is the creation of a state of mind that either
encourages one thing or discourages something else. Under
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these terms, motives and culture as well as weapons and
tactics become crucial.62
Contemporary “War” Is Not Limited; It Is Total. Seventh,
contemporary nontraditional “conflict” is not a kind of
appendage (a lesser or limited thing) to the more
comfortable military paradigm. It is a great deal more. As
long as opposition exists in Colombia or anywhere else
which is willing to risk all to take down a government
violently and establish one more to its own liking, there is
war. This is a zero-sum game in which there is only one
winner. It is, thus, total. In his novel, The Centurians, Jean
Larteguy vividly captures the difference between
traditional warfare designed to achieve limited political,
economic, or territorial concession and the totality of the
type of threats we confront today. He contrasts the French
(traditional) and the Vietminh (total) methods of securing
vital interests in the following passage:
It is difficult to explain exactly, but it is rather like [the card
game] bridge as compared to belote. When we [the French]
make war, we play belote with 32 cards in the pack. But the
Viet Minh’s game is bridge and they have 52 cards—20 more
than we do. Those 20 cards short will always prevent us from
getting the better of them. They’ve got nothing to do with
traditional [military] warfare, they’re marked with the signs
of POLITICS, PROPAGANDA, FAITH, AGRARIAN
REFORM . . . What’s biting [the French officer]? I think he is
beginning to realize that we’ve got to play with 52 cards and he
doesn’t like it at all. . . . Those extra cards aren’t at all to his
liking.63

Conclusions. These are the realities for now and into the
next century. As the United States and its armed forces
transition over the next months and years to deal more
effectively with the requirements of the 21st century, we
should contemplate the problems of threat and response in
the terms outlined above. The consequences of failing to do
so are clear. Unless thinking and actions are reoriented to
deal with those realities, the problems of global, regional,
and sub-regional (Colombian) stability and security will
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resolve themselves—stability and security will be gone
along with the complicated problems they present.
Implications, Part 3: The Strategic Adaptation of
U.S. Military Efficacy to the Colombian Threat
Environment.
The earlier two sections dealing with Implications set
forth fundamental strategic civil-military directions and
additional imperatives that should inform the debate on
what is to be done in Colombia. They also provide direction
in terms of the nontraditional and complex threat that
requires a change of perspective from unilateral responses
to multilateral and highly coordinated responses; from
primarily blunt police and military tools of power to finer,
people-oriented instruments of action; and from ad hoc and
piecemeal crisis management to deliberate and holistic
commitments of resources and will.
The third set of Implications concerns the strategic
application of U.S. military power. At the outset, however, it
should be noted that the ultimate responsibility for
reversing the political-economic-social-security
deterioration of that country and setting it on a more
positive course lies with Colombians. As Michael Shifter
argues, “They have borne the enormous costs of the
country’s decline—and they will enjoy the fruits of whatever
progress it makes.”64 Yet, the United States, as the crucial
interested outside actor, has indispensable experience,
resources, and political clout. The judicious application of
lessons learned from relevant experiences similar to those
of Colombia could make the difference between success and
failure of the Colombian armed forces in helping to achieve
the political-economic-social-security regeneration of their
country. Key lessons learned center on professional military
education and leader development.65 In these teacher,
mentor, and role model terms, U.S. military forces can act as
a major positive influence for enhancing and strengthening
democracy, stability, and peace in Colombia.66
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The Central Strategic Problem. Thus, we come back to
where we began. We return to Clausewitz’s first and most
comprehensive of all strategic questions which is crucial to
understanding the central political problem.67 Democracy,
stability, and sustainable peace depend on effective and
legitimate control of the national territory and the people in
it. The Colombian government must achieve that control in
a manner that safeguards the human rights, civil liberties,
and personal security of all its citizens. At the same time,
the government must enhance its political legitimacy,
provide economic progress, and engender social justice. Sun
Tzu reminds us, “Those who excel in war first cultivate their
own humanity and justice and maintain their laws and
institutions. By these means, they make their governments
invincible.”68
For the Colombian government to accomplish these
formidable tasks within the context of illegal insurgent,
narco-trafficker, and paramilitary violence, it must do two
things. First, it must professionalize and modernize the
country’s police forces and judicial system to the point
where they can enforce and administer the law fairly and
effectively throughout the entire country. Second, the
government must professionalize and modernize the
military to a level where it has the capability to neutralize
and/or destroy the illegal perpetrators of violence
throughout the national territory. The intent and
requirement are to generate the societal acceptance and
support that controlling institutions need to manage
contemporary violence adequately—and to guarantee a
durable peace.69
Governments not responsive to the importance of the
central strategic problem of controlling the national
territory and the population find themselves in a “crisis of
governance.” They face increasing social violence, criminal
anarchy, and eventual overthrow. Solutions to this problem
take us beyond training small units for conducting
aggressive operations against narco-traffickers to broader
professional military education and leader development.
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What the Military Must Do: Primary Requirements. The
United States has had a great deal of experience and success
in training military forces to take the offensive against
enemies on the battlefield and in teaching armed forces how
to fight according to the humane considerations required
under the just war concept. The United States must
continue to help train and educate Colombian forces in
those fundamentals. Nevertheless, additional training and
education are also necessary. At the least, a carefully
designed and relatively modest assistance program could
vastly increase the speed at which military and police forces
professionalize and modernize themselves. A former
Department of State Director of Andean Affairs,
Ambassador David Passage, provides a short list of the most
important deficiencies and areas for improvement in the
Colombian military and police forces:
Development of strategy. The Colombian army does
not yet have a viable, comprehensive strategy to restore
government control over the national territory.
Training and doctrine for joint operations. The
Colombian military is only now beginning to develop a
doctrine for joint operations, which should include the
national police; it must use army, navy, and air force assets
to reinforce each others’ skills and strengths and
compensate for weaknesses.
Far-reaching improvement in the collection,
evaluation, and dissemination of usable operational
intelligence. To describe the Colombian military’s
collection and evaluation of intelligence as “primitive”
would be charitable. Dissemination of usable, actionable
intelligence is virtually nonexistent due to rivalries and
distrust between military and police units and their leaders.
Development of quick reaction capabilities.
Colombia needs to create such capabilities to react
immediately to intelligence on high-value targets.
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Significant improvement in transport capability
and lift. Additional trucks and other vehicles are needed on
the ground; fixed and rotary wing aircraft are also
imperative to help restore government control over the
national territory.70
What the Military Must Do: Some Intermediate
Recommendations for U.S.-Monitored Professional Military
Education and Leader Development in Colombia. Changing
mind-sets to develop leader judgment needed to deal
effectively with the complex, politically dominated,
multidimensional, multiorganizational, multinational, and
multicultural internal conflict in Colombia requires a
carefully staffed, phased, and long-term validation,
planning, and implementation program at all levels. The
recommended basic direction for such an effort is outlined
as follows.
• First, the study of the fundamental nature of conflict
has always been the philosophical cornerstone for
comprehending the essence of traditional war. It is no less
relevant to nontraditional conflict. As examples,
nontraditional national interests centering on “well-being”
must be carefully defined and implemented. At the same
time, the application of all the instruments of national and
international power—including the full integration of
legitimate civilian partners—as part of a synergistic
process to achieve Colombia’s political ends has to be
rethought and refined.
• Second, in that connection, Colombian police, military,
political, and civilian leaders at all levels must acquire the
ability to interact collegially and effectively with
representatives of international organizations, U.S. civilian
agencies, indigenous national civilian agencies, NGOs, local
and global news media, and civilian populations. The intent
is to achieve unity of effort, not just unity of command.
• Third, in turn, military and nonmilitary leaders at all
levels must understand the strategic and political
implications of tactical and operational-level actions. They
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must also understand the ways that military force can be
employed to achieve political and psychological ends and
understand and accept the ways that political
considerations affect the use of force.
• Fourth, leaders at all levels must understand that
information can be a force multiplier. At the same time, lack
of timely information and intelligence can be a force
minimizer. Waiting for higher or other headquarters to
provide timely, accurate, and detailed local intelligence has
often proved costly in terms of mission achievement and
force protection. As a consequence, Colombian professional
military education and leader development must foster the
idea that commanders have to take responsibility and the
initiative for collecting and managing relevant information
for their own use.
• Fifth, education and training for contemporary
Colombian intranational conflict must prepare military and
police personnel at all levels to be effective war-fighters.
Political actors such as illegal drug traffickers, insurgents,
and paramilitaries have at their disposal an awesome array
of conventional and unconventional weaponry to use for
their own purposes. Additionally, because of the highly
charged political-psychological environment in which they
must work, soldiers and police officers must also display
political sensitivity, considerable restraint, and strong
discipline.71
A supplementary list of intermediate-level imperatives
would focus on the following:
• The power of the interagency process when used
correctly and the impotence of unilateral actions, even when
“leading in support”;
• The notion of indirect engagement versus direct
involvement;
• Regional, hemispheric, and global implications of
actions;
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• The concept of multiple centers of gravity, to include
public opinion and leadership;
• The power of information and public diplomacy and the
penalties that are paid when these instruments of power are
not used, channeled, or harnessed;
• The importance of learning how to defend one’s own
centers of gravity as well as attacking those of an opponent
and the ultimate penalty for not doing so; and again,
• The fact that contemporary conflict is not “limited,” it is
“total.”72
What the Military Must Do: Some Advanced
Requirements. As early as 1990, as a follow-on to the
Cartegena (Colombia) Summit, a U.S. interagency team
headed by Ambassador Edwin G. Corr met with presidents
of Andean countries, along with other government officials
and representatives of major groups within the private
sector, to make recommendations for counter-narcotics
assistance to interested governments. The team concluded
that a successful response to illegal drug trafficking and
production must deal with political, social, cultural, and
security ramifications of narcotics problems—not just law
enforcement and economic aspects. What was
recommended then and is still required is a holistic
approach that deals with root causes, enhances legitimate
governance, and provides more than cosmetic security
throughout a given country.73
These recommendations for success against illegal
narcotics trafficking are interestingly similar to those listed
in the Implications Sections above. Additionally, there are
at least five tasks that could be initiated at any time that do
not depend on the accomplishment of the primary and
intermediate requirements for relevance in the
contemporary security arena.
• Help the Colombian government to identify and correct
key strategic political, economic, and social shortcomings;
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• Renew the U.S. executive-legislative understanding of
the purpose of security assistance by recommending
carefully constructed conditions as guidelines for the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 in accordance with the
realities of contemporary conflict;
• Recommend the repeal of the legal prohibition against
most U.S. aid to foreign police;
• Replace U.S. operationally oriented officers with
Foreign Area Officer (FAO) diagnosticians to design and
manage indirect and direct security assistance programs;
and,
• Ensure that direct and indirect military aid to the
Colombian government makes a direct contribution to the
strategic objectives of promoting democracy, human rights,
economic development, social justice, personal and
collective security, and a durable peace for the entire
country.74
To quote Ambassador Passage again, “If the United
States is serious about wanting to see a reduction in the
production and trafficking in illegal narcotics, it needs to
accept the fact that no reduction is likely until the
Colombian government regains control of its national
territory and is able to deal with narco-traffickers on the
basis of law.”75 At the same time Passage says, “If the
United States is serious about wanting to see a reduction in
human rights abuses, it should offer training programs to
help professionalize both Colombia’s police and military
forces so than neither of them believes it has to resort to
human rights abuses and deny civil liberties in order to
enforce laws and maintain public order.”76
It must be remembered, however, that the United States
can help Colombia’s government and armed forces evaluate
shortcomings and overcome them by providing advice,
training, education, and equipment. Yet, the changes
necessary to take control of the national territory will occur
only if the Colombians want U.S. help—and are willing to
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apply the lessons learned from their own and U.S.
experience.
A Cautionary Concluding Note. The above outline of
fundamental strategic recommendations, additional
strategic and high operational-level imperatives, and the
professional military education and leader development
imperatives for the strategic adaptation of U.S. military
power to the Colombian security situation takes us back to
where we began. This list of recommendations for “what is
to be done” provides the basis for the understanding and
judgment that civilian and military leaders must have to be
clear on what the situation in Colombia is and what it is not.
The hard evidence over time underscores the wisdom of
Clausewitz’s dictum, “The first, the supreme, the most
far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and the
commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war
on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor
trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”77
These recommendations for the adaptation of U.S. civil
and military efficacy to the crisis in Colombia take us
beyond doing “something” for something’s sake. They take
us beyond developing budgets, force structure, and
equipment packages for a given crisis situation. They take
us beyond asking, “What are we going to do?” “Who is going
to command and control the effort?” “How is it to be done?”
These imperatives take us to the development of a mutually
agreed-upon strategic vision (that is, the political
end-game). In turn, these imperatives take us to the
cooperative, holistic, and long-term planning and
implementation of the objectives (strategic ends), ways
(strategic courses of action), and means (strategic
monetary, personnel, and equipment resources) that
directly support the achievement of the political
end-game.78
There is very little glamour, only a few sound bites, and
not many career enhancement possibilities inherent in
much of the work outlined above, but it does have great
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potential for directing progress toward democracy, stability,
and a sustainable peace.
The Challenge, the Task, and Threat.
The primary challenge is for senior civilian and military
leaders to change perspectives and realize that putting
money, personnel, and equipment into a situation such as
that in Colombia without first doing the fundamentals will
result in ad hoc, piecemeal, disjointed, premature—and
over the long term, ineffective—reactions to problems.79
The main task includes four sub-tasks. The first is to
develop an adequate intellectual framework (strategic
paradigm) to deal with Colombia’s Hobbesian trinity and its
root causes. The second is to promulgate adequate
organizational structure to generate international, U.S.,
and U.S.-Colombian unity of effort. The third is to develop
appropriate instruments of hard and soft power for political
and psychological as well as military purposes. The fourth
task is to generate strong international, U.S.,
U.S.-Colombian, and regional public understanding and
support that will guarantee all parties the ability to stay the
course.80
The danger is that unless responses are highly
cooperative, carefully coordinated, well-organized, and
conducted with considerable political skill, strategic
ambiguity is introduced into the situation. In a situation
such as that in Colombia, strategic ambiguity (1) provides
the opportunity for opponents to “play at the seams” and
frustrate objectives; (2) allows friends and allies to pursue
their own narrow agendas; (3) allows political, personnel,
and monetary costs to rise; and (4) increases the probability
of failure and unnecessary loss of life.81
Conclusions.
Two fundamental sets of requirements underlie this
discussion. The first is the need for Colombian leaders to
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learn how to optimize capabilities in an ambiguous,
nontraditional, and intranational security environment.
The second involves U.S.-Colombian-international
political partnership requirements to achieve civil-military
and national-international unity of effort. Together, these
two sets of requirements are essential for strategic clarity
and success in complex stability operations. It must be
remembered that the final outcome of a conflict such as
that in Colombia is not determined simply by the
manipulation of violence on a traditional battlefield.
Rather, control of the entire situation and its successful
resolution are determined by the qualitative judgments
and unity of effort that directly support overriding political
requirements.
Some Final Reflections.
The primary verities and implications of the security
situation in the Western Hemisphere and Colombia are
clear. First, the world has seen and will continue to see a
wide range of ambiguous and uncomfortable threats in the
gray area between war and peace. Second, these threats
and challenges—manifested by transnational illegal drug
trafficking, organized crime, corruption, terrorism,
warlordism, insurgency, civil war, regional wars, and
humanitarian problems such as large-scale refugee flows
and famine—are the consequences of root cause pressures
and problems perpetrated and/or exploited by a variety of
internal and transnational political actors. Third, the
spillover effects of Colombian gray area phenomena into
the rest of the hemisphere ultimately place demands on the
international community, if not to solve the problems, at
least to harbor the victims.82
The policy implications for the United States and the
Western community—and their military and police
organizations—regarding the illegal transnational
narcotics trade in Colombia are far-reaching. Probably the
most important, from a U.S. policy perspective, is that the
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fragile democracy in that country is at risk. Of equal
importance from the perspectives of both U.S. and
Colombian policy and practicability, the various internal
and transnational threats posed by illegal drug
trafficking—and the violence stemming from it—are being
overlooked and evaded at the macro-strategic level. The
result is a series of tactical and operational “successes” on
the battlefield over the past 40 years that are irrelevant to
the strategic whole.
Lessons learned for virtually every conflict over the 40
years from Algeria, to El Salvador, to Somalia, to the former
Yugoslavia, demonstrate that the situation in Colombia
requires the greatest international, U.S.-Colombian,
civil-military, and military-to-military diplomacy,
cooperation, and synergism. 83 These recommended
multidimensional integrative efforts at the strategic and
high-operational levels will lead to the establishment of
conditions that will allow Colombia to renew its political
solvency and legitimacy—and that will lead to the
achievement of a mutually agreed-upon mandate for
sustainable peace.
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